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STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENER-
AL DETERMINATION OF ALL 
THE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF 
WATER, BOTH SURF ACE AND 
UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE 
DRAIN AGE AREA OF THE 
GREEN RIVER ABOVE THE CON-
FLUENCE OF, BUT INCLUDING 
POT CREEK, IN DAGGETT, SUM-
MIT AND UINTAH COUNTIES, 
UTAH. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10284 
This action is for a general determination of the rights 
to the use of water pursuant to Chapter 4, Title 73, U. C. 
A., 1953. The water source covered by this proceeding in-
cludes all of the drainage area of the Green River, both 
surface and underground, above the confluence of, but in-
cluding Pot Creek, in Daggett, Summit and Uintah Coun-
ties, Utah. 
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The respondent State Engineer would like to make it 
clear at the outset that his position in a general adjudica-
tion proceeding is that of a state administrative officer 
and not as one water user against another. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was heard before the District Court in the 
Third Judicial District, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge, 
upon appellant's objections to the proposed determiRation 
of water rights and the answer of the State Engilleer. In-
sofar as this appeal is concerned, the water users claims 
filed by the appellant were confirmed as contained in the 
proposed determination with the exception of Award Num-
ber 14 in the decree of September 25, 1964, which involves 
water users' claim numbers 265, 2716, 2718 and 2719. Cer-
tain other awards were made between appellant and others 
in the decree, but these are not involved in this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents submit that the decision of the Dis-
trict Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents submit that the following statement 
of facts is a more correct statement of the evidence actually 
before the District Court than is contained in appellant's 
brief, viewed as it must be in a light most favorable to the 
decision of the District Court. This action was initiated 
upon petition of water users in 1948 as provided for in 
Section 73-4-1, U. C. A., 1953, and subsequently, in 1953, 
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it was enlarged to cover the present area. (See the general 
findings prefacing the specific awards in each copy of the 
proposed determination, Volumes 5 and 6 of the record.) 
Appellant was made a party to the action pursuant to 43 
U. S. C. § 666, and originally filed 715 separate water users 
claims setting forth in detail the rights to the use of water 
claimed. Subsequently some additional claims were sub-
mitted. (Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of the record.) Each of these 
water users claims set forth the origin of the right, point 
of diversion, period of use, nature of use, priority, extent 
and place of use and such other material as will completely 
define the right claimed as is provided for in Section 73-
4-5, U. C. A., 1953. (Sections 6, 7 and 8 specify certain 
additional information for the uses specified in these sec-
tions.) While all of the information in the claims is rele-
vant, of particular significance insofar as this appeal is 
concerned is the priority of the claims appellant submitted 
which can be generally grouped as follows: 
1862 - 57 claims 
1864 - 37 claims 
1870 - 143 claims 
187 4 - 1 claim 
1878 - 5 claims 
1879 - 163 claims 
1886 - 125 claims 
1888 - 25 claims 
1892 - 73 claims 
1900 - 115 claims 
1902 - 22 claims 
(The remaining claims bear priorities from 1916 to 
1960 ;rncl are based upon applications to appropriate filed 
in the office of the State Engineer, or upon adverse use.) 
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We wculd like to point out that the document entitled 
' 
"Response of the United States", which was submitted by 
appellant \'.-ith its wat~r user's claims and quoted on pages 
3 and 4 of appellant's brief, was not a water user's claim. 
This document appears to be a statement of various legal 
theories by which apj_)ellant asserts it can acquire a water 
right but does not purport to describe any specific water 
right. 
In accordance with Section 73-4-11, U. C. A., 1953, the 
State Engineer prepared and submitted to the District 
Court and the \vater users a Proposed Determination of 
Water Rights. (Volumes 5 and 6 of the record.) All of 
appellant's claims \ve1·e incorporated into the proposed de-
termination, by the State Engineer, setting forth the in-
formation as it was contained in the claim. In each and 
every case the proposed determination states the origin of 
the right proposed. For those rights which were based on 
the beneficial use of water prior to 1903, the appellant 
claimed and was awarded a diligence right based upon the 
use of the water by its permittees, licencees and lessees. In 
other cases, the rights were based upon applications filed 
in the office of the State Engineer, and in some instances 
upon adverse use. The appellant did not object to these 
awards as being incorrect nor offer evidence of any uses 
in addition to those contained in the proposed determina· 
tion. 
After being served with the proposed determination as 
provided for in Section 73-4-11, U. C. A., 1953, the appel· 
lant filed a protest which, among other things, objected 
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to the fact that no rights were awarded appellant under 
the reservation theory. Simply stated, this theory is based 
on the proposition that the reservation of federal lands im-
pliedly reserves the water needed to carry out the purpose 
for which the land was reserved. 
In answer to the protest of the appellant, which is 
quoted on page 5 of appellant's brief, the State Engineer 
stated: 
"In answer to paragraph 8 of said protest, the 
State Engineer admits that the proposed determin-
ation does not recognize any water rights for this 
protestant beyond those set forth in said determina-
tion; denies that protestant has any water rights 
in this area, except those set forth in said determin-
ation; the State Engineer further alleges that pro-
testant is required to assert specifically all the 
rights to the use of water from this source to which 
it is entitled but has not filed water user's claims 
for any uses except those contained in said determ-
ination." 
Still appellant filed nothing in the way of a water user 
claim based upon this theory, nor did appellant submit any 
rviclence at the trial that it was entitled to any specific 
wat21· which was not already .covered in the claims there-
tofore submitted. Further, the record does not even show 
~111y evidence of the reservations which appellant now 
quotes in its brief on page 4 as the basis of the right. There 
m:is no evidence submitted by the appellant relative to the 
purposes for which the land was reserved, nor that there 
is any water used for reservation purposes or that appel-
lant will in the future require any additional water from 
any of the sources here being adjudicated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, IN 
CONFORNIANCE vVITH SECTION 73-4-12, U 
C. A., 1953, AW ARDS TO APPELLANT ALL 
OF THE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER TO 
WHICH APPELLANT ESTABLISHED A 
RIGHT IN THIS ADJUDICATION PROCEED-
ING. 
A. THE PLEADINGS APPELLANT FILED 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT 
ALLEGE ANY CLAIM TO THE USE OF 
WATER UNDER THE RESERVATION 
THEORY. 
The gist of appellant's argument, as we understand 
it, is that the decree of the District Court is correct as far 
as it goes, but it should also contain a statement that ap· 
pellant has rights to the water on the lands which have 
been reserved for national forests. We are not certain 
from appellant's brief whether it is claiming that the water 
which was awarded by the court decree should have also 
been awarded under the reservation theory, or whether it 
is claiming the right to additional waters from this source. 
Therefore, we will discuss both propositions. In order to 
properly evaluate appellant's position, we must review the 
purpose and scope of these proceedings. 
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The complete procedure for a general adjudication 
action, from the initiation through to the final judgment 
by the court, is provided for in Chapter 4 of Title 73, U. 
C. A., 1953. The legislature has set out the exclusive man-
ner in which a right to the use of water may be asserted 
in this type of proceeding. Section 73-4-5, U. C. A., 1953, 
provides: 
"Each person claiming a right to use any water 
of such river system or water source shall, within 
ninety days after the completed service of notice 
of completion of survey prescribed by section 73-4-
3 hereof, file in the office of the clerk of the district 
court a statement in writing which shall be signed 
and verified by the oath of the claimant, and shall 
include as near as may be the following: The name 
and post-office address of the person making the 
claim; the nature of the use on which the claim of 
appropriation is based; the flow of water used in 
cu bk feet per second or the quantity of water 
stored in acre-feet, and the time during which it 
has been used each year; the name of the stream or 
other source from which the water is diverted, the 
point on such stream or source where the water is 
diverted, and the nature of the diverting works; the 
date when the first work for diverting the water 
was begun, and the nature of such work; the date 
when the water was first used, the flow in cubic 
feet per second or the quantity of water stored in 
ac1·e-f eet, and the time during which the water was 
used the first year; and the place and manner of 
present use; and such other facts as will clearly de-
fine the extent and nature of the appropriation 
claimed, or as may be required by the blank form 
which shall be furnished by the State Engineer un-
der the direction of the court." 
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The individual water users claims become the plead. 
ings in the adjudication. Section 73-4-14, U. C. A., 1953, 
states: 
"The statements filed by the claimants shall 
stand in the place of pleadings, and issues may be 
made thereon." 
In the case of Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co. v. Burton, 
70 Utah 239, 259 P. 408 (1927) which involved an adjudi· 
cation of water rights under this statute, this court rec· 
ognized that "* * * the familiar rules of practice and 
procedure by whid1 the courts are guided in ordinary law. 
suits do not apply in such cases where the legislature has 
laid down other and different rules relative to a particular 
subject". We submit that the only manner by which a 
claimant in this proceedings can assert his claim to water 
is by substantial compliance with the above procedure. 
However, it should be observed that the procedure for 
pleading a water right under the above sections is not 
greatly different from any action between two parties to 
quiet title to water. The person claiming the right to water 
must establish with certainty the various elements whkh 
go to make up a water right. As stated by this court in 
Hardy v. Beaver Co. Irr. Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524 
(1924) : 
"None of the respondents claim to have used 
the water throughout the winter season, and with· 
out exception such evidence as was offered by the 
several respondents in support of their respective 
claims is wholly insufficient in respect to the quan· 
tity used and period of use to satisfy that degree of 
-
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certainty which is required to establish priorities 
to the use of the public waters of the state and to 
enable the court, by its decree, to establish the re-
spective rights of the parties to the use of the com-
mon resource. As was said by this .court in the case 
of Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 19, 168 P. 273, 
at 274: 
"'One of the essentials of a valid judgment is 
that the judgment be definite and certain respect-
ing the relief granted. In judgments defining and 
determining conflicting claims, rights, and inter-
ests in and to the use of water in this arid region, 
the application of the foregoing rule is indispens-
able. The rule, the soundness of which is self-evi-
dent, is so well established that it would be a work 
of supererogation to cite authorities illustrating 
and supporting it.' 
"It is but stating the corollary of the foregoing 
pronouncement to add that it is equally incumbent 
upon claimants in actions of this kind to prove the 
extent of their appropriations both in time and 
amount with the same degree of certainty. Sowards 
v. Meagher, 37 Utah 222; Walsh v. Wallace, 26 Nev. 
299, 67 P. 914, 918, 99 Am. St. Rep. 692." 
Appellant did not file a single water users claim based 
on the so-called "reservation theory". This is apparent 
when one reviews the claims. However, before discussing 
these claims in detail we would like to emphasize that the 
document entitled, "Response of the United States" which 
appellant quotes on pages 3 and 4 of its brief is not a water 
users claim. This document can be construed as nothing 
more than an allegation of various legal theories by which 
the appellant claims it can acquire water rights. In effect 
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it was submitted as a letter of transmittal to accompany 
the 715 specific claims which were filed. Further, the rec-
ord before this court does not contain any of the evidence 
relative to the reservation of lands for forest purposes 
which is set forth on page 4 of appellant's brief. The rights 
of the parties are to be determined from the record that 
is before this court, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 491. 
Turning now to the specific water users' claims which 
were originally filed, plus those subsequently submitted, we 
would like to point out certain facts which we consider rele-
vant to this appeal. Paragraph 4 of each statement of 
water users' claim contains the user's declaration of the 
origin of the water right claimed. All of appellant's claims 
assert a right acquired pursuant to state law and make no 
reference to the reservation theory. In those cases where 
the water was put to a beneficial use prior to 1903 the ap-
pellant claimed and was awarded a diligence right. These 
rights rest on proof of an appropriation of the water to a 
beneficial use prior to the 1903 date, Yardley v. Swapp, 12 
Utah 2d 146, 364 P. 2d 4 ( 1961). In this regard it is sig-
nificant that the priorities of the majority of the claims 
filed by appellant predate the earliest date of withdrawal 
of land for forest purposes, according to the statements of 
withdrawal of these lands in appellant's brief. We wish 
to make it clear that we deny that the statements in ap· 
pellant's brief can now be considered as evidence of a 
water right under the reservation theory. Certainly ap· 
pellant cannot seriously contend that these rights were also 
reserved with a priority ahead of the date of the reserva· 
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tion of the land. If water was reserved at the time of the 
withdrawal of the land it would have to take the priority 
of the date of the reservation, Arizona v. California, 376 
U. S. 340 (1964) : and United States v. Walker River Irr. 
D1:st., 104 F. 2d 334 (1939). 
With regard to the remaining diligence claims none of 
the priorities claimed correspond with the dates appellant 
now asserts for the reservation of the land for forest pur-
poses. The remaining claims of the appellant, with priori-
ties subsequent to 1903, are either based on applications 
filed in the office of the State Engineer or upon adverse 
use. When the rights of appellant were set forth in the pro-
posed determination of water rights by the State Engineer, 
he listed the source and type of right proposed. In the case 
of each claim by appellant the right is shown as being 
vested under state law. The appellant did not protest these 
awards, but simply stated in its protest that it was entitled 
to rights based upon the reservation theory; to which the 
State Engineer answered that appellant "* * * has 
not filed water users' claims for any uses except those con-
tained in said determination." (See paragraph 7 of the 
answer of the State Engineer.) We respectfully submit 
that appellant has not filed any pleading which would form 
the basis of an award for an additional water right in this 
adjudication proceedings. 
B. THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION AND 
THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
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UPON WHICH THE COURT COULD BASE 
THE AWARD OF AN ADDITIONAL 
WATER RIGHT TO APPELLANT IN THIS 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant did not off er any evidence which would sup-
port the right which is now claimed. The only evidence 
which the record shows was before the trial court was the 
water user's claims and the proposed determination. Sec-
tion 73-4-14, supra, provides that the water user's claims 
shall be competent evidence of the facts stated therein un-
less the same are put in issue. As we have pointed out 
above, the claims of the appellant were evidence of rights 
acquired according to state law. This is also reflected in 
the proposed determination; and if we correctly assess ap-
pellant's position, it does not question these awards. Rather, 
it would assert that the same right should again be awarded 
to it under the reservation theory. The obvious conclusion 
is that since the majority of rights claimed were already 
vested there was nothing further appellant could acquire 
with regard to these specific awards. However, if appel-
lant was seeking a right based on the reservation theory 
it would be essential to prove: the area covered by the 
reservation; what, if any water was intended to be re-
served; the quantity, priority, point of diversion, place and 
nature of use of the water. In other words, it would be 
necessary to submit some evidence of the right claimed. 
Certainly, no court could formulate a decree defining a 
water right without this information. Again it is obvious 
from the record there was not sufficient evidence before 
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the court upon which it could make a finding. Appellant 
was not in any way limited in its proof, and if it had ad-
ditional claims it was required to prove them. In this re-
gard we believe the report of the Special Master, in Arizona 
v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963) dated December 5, 1960, 
is particularly significant.1 His findings and decree formed 
the basis of the ruling from the United States Supreme 
Court upon which appellant now so heavily relies. On page 
334 of the report in discussing the daims of the United 
States under the reservation theory, the Master stated: 
"With the exception of the Gila National For-
est, it is unnecessary to pass on the claims of the 
United States for water for any of the other nine 
federal establishments, because the United States 
has not demonstrated, except as to the Gila National 
Forest, that it presently utilizes or requires water 
from the mainstream of the Gila or its interstate 
tributaries in order to carry out the purposes of 
these establishments. Nor has the United States 
demonstrated, again excepting the Gila National 
Forest, that it will in the future require water from 
these sources. There is, therefore, no controversy 
over uses by these federal establishments to be ad-
judicated. Certainly it would be inappropriate to 
adjudicate the claims of the United States (with 
the exception noted) at this time since those claims 
may never be exercised much less questioned. More-
over, it would be impossible on the basis of this 
record to determine the water rights of the United 
States (except for the Gila National Forest) either 
on the basis of state law or on the basis of federal 
reservation of water." 
1A copy of this report oan be found in the library adjacent to the 
offices of the Utah Water and Power Board, Room 435, State Capitol. 
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In an early decision this court announced that it would 
not reverse a decision which conformed to the pleading and 
evidence presented to the trial court, Gunnison Irr. Co. v. 
Gunnison H. C. Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 P. 852 (1918): 
"There is another and even more elementary 
reason why the respondent's contention cannot pre-
vail. This case was tried to the court below under 
pleadings drawn, evidence heard, and findings, con-
clusions, and decree made solely under the theory 
of acquisition of rights to the use of water under 
the doctrine of appropriation for beneficial use. 
Upon the part of all parties the suit was a simple 
suit to quiet title to the usufruct under such theory. 
In no way whatever did the case as pleaded and 
tried involve any element either of title to the cor-
pus of water, or right to change the mode of enjoy-
ment from that of direct irrigation to that of stor-
age for use from time to time as crops require. To 
sustain the position of respondent upon this appeal, 
it would be necessary to hold that the trial court 
in its decision departed from the path marked out 
by the pleadings. The record does not justify such 
a conclusion. But even if the trial court had so de-
parted from the issues, the legal effect of its decree 
would be limited to the issues raised by the plead-
ings. Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U. S. 259, 34 Sup. 
Ct. 95, 58 L. Ed. 209, at 216." 
We respectfully submit that based upon the evidence 
in this case appellant has not proved that it is entitled to 
any additional awards in this proceeding. 
The decree of the court, in confirming the claims in 
the proposed determination, awarded to appellant all the 
rights to the use of water to which it was entitled. Section 
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73-4-15, U. C. A., 1953 specifically states that after a hear-
ing judgment shall be entered as provided for in Section 
73-4-12, U. C. A., 1953. This latter section of the statute 
provides that the court will enter judgment: 
"* * * whkh shall determine and establish 
the rights of the several claimants to the use of the 
water of said river system or water source; and 
among other things it shall set forth the name and 
post-office address of the person entitled to the use 
of the water; the quantity of water in acre-feet or 
the flow of water in second-feet; the time during 
·which the water is to be used each year; the name 
of the stream or other source from which the water 
is diverted; the point on the stream or other source 
from which the water is diverted; the priority date 
of the right; and such other matters as will fully 
and completely define the rights of said claimants 
to the use of the water." 
This court has stated the findings must set forth the 
information required by this statute, Plain City Irr. Co. v. 
Hooper Irr. Co., 87 Utah 545, 51 P. 2d 1069 (1935). The 
decree in this action fully complies with the requirements 
of this section of the code, and awards to appellant all of 
the water the evidence shows that it has a right to use. 
The fact that appellant may sometime in the future have 
additional uses of water does not present the court with a 
basis for a determination of what those rights may be. The 
above quoted statute specifically states that the judgment 
shall reflect the claimant's right to the use of the water, 
not some possible or potential use. This court has on num-
erous occasions held that the nature of a general determ-
ination proceedings, is, in effect, a determination of the 
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present rights to the use of water. It is not a determina-
tion of uses which may in the future come into existence; 
rather its purpose is to settle and determine in one decree 
the present existing rights and uses of the parties. In 
Smith v. District Court of Second Judicial District for Mor. 
gan County, 69 Utah 493, 256 P. 539 ( 1927) at p. 501 of 
the Utah Reporter, the court after making a review of the 
general adjudication statute stated: 
"After a most careful and thorough examina-
tion of the statute in question we have been unable 
to find any warrant for the court in such action 
to undertake to determine any question except 
rights to the use of the water involved and, per-
haps, as a necessary corollary injunctive relief for 
the protection of such rights after they have been 
adjudicated and determined. No provision appears 
to have been made for cross-actions for any further 
or different relief than the determination of such 
rights." 
In a subsequent de·cision the court again took occasion 
to point out what is contemplated in a general determina-
tion action, Mammoth Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Burton, 70 
Utah 239, 259 P. 408 (1927) at pp. 249 and 250 of the Utah 
Reporter: 
"The terms 'general determination,' as used in 
this section and elsewhere in the statute, as we un-
derstand them, without attempting an exact defi-
nition, connote a determination of all rights within 
the system or other source existing at the time that 
the court is called upon to act or when the decree 
is made, and which is based upon the surveys and 
investigations made by the state engineer that are 
provided for in the statute, and made in an action 
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conducted under and substantially in conformity 
with that law." 
The Utah Court in Huntsville Irrigation Association 
v. Distl'ict Court of Weber County, 72 Utah 431, 270 P. 
1090 ( 1928) disc used these adions in terms of present ex-
isting uses of water. 
"As stated in effect in the passage last quoted, 
the old system of trying such cases by piecemeal had 
proved ineffectual in many cases and was in the 
highest degree unsatisfactory. The intent of the 
Legislature and the purpose of the statute appar-
ently was to remedy the evil then existing in de-
termining the rights of parties in this class of cases. 
The statute provides no remedy for any relief ex-
cept the determination of rights to the use of water 
and as a necessary corollary thereto such injunc-
tive relief as may be necessary to protect and en-
force such rights." (Emphasis added.) 
Viewed in light of the above statements by this court 
concerning the result to be accomplished in a general de-
termination action, we submit that there is no issue pre-
sented on this appeal. Appellant was awarded the rights 
to the use of water requested in its water user's claims. 
Clearly there is nothing more contemplated in a general 
determination action. If appellant were seeking relief be-
cause the trial court denied a claim for an existing use of 
water, there would then be some grounds for appeal. How-
ever, we are hard put to see how a water user who is 
awarded rights for all of the uses which are claimed upon 
the theory which he claimed them can now find cause to 
appeal to this court. Appellant makes no claim that it 
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should not be awarded the uses ·which it claims under state 
law. In addition to assertions made in the individual water 
user's claims, the very document which appellant asserts 
as its claim to water based on the reservation theory states: 
"* * * the United States bases its claims upon approp-
riations made unde1 Utah law and also upon such other 
rights under Utah law as may be valid * * * " 
C. APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A DE-
TERMINATION BY THIS COURT OF 
RIGHTS UNDER THE RESERVATION 
THEORY PRESENTS TO THIS COURT 
AN ABSTRACT, MOOT ISSUE. 
In light of the pleadings, evidence and decree of the 
court in this action, we submit that appellant is requesting 
this court to determine a question of law in advance of a 
right be asserted or contested. It would be just as logical 
for appellant to request this court to rule on whether or 
not it has or may have rights by reason of its treaty mak-
ing powers, its requirements for flood control and naviga-
tion, and any other applicable rights and povvers under the 
Constitution of the United States and the Acts of Congress. 
All of these possibilities are stated in the "Response of the 
United States'', which appellant contends raises the reser· 
vation question. 
\i'Ve urge that appellant's contention that it should be 
awarded water rights under the reservation theory comes 
within the rule that courts on appeal will not consider moot, 
abstrad questions on appeal. 
"The term 'moot' as used in connection with 
cases or questions which the courts refuse to review 
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as merely academic has been variously defined to 
include cases in which determination is sought of 
an abstract question which does not rest upon ex-
isting facts or rights, cases or questions as to which 
in reality there is no actual controversy existing, 
cases in which the rights in contest have expired 
by lapse of time, cases as to which no judgment 
rendered could be carried into effect, and cases 
which seek a decision in advance about a right, be-
fore it has been actually asserted and contested. 5 
Am,, Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 762." 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers Workers 
Union, Local 248, 32 N. W. 2d 190 (1948) gives a good 
definition of the proposition which appellant is seeking to 
advance in this case : 
"A moot case has been defined as one which 
seeks to determine an abstract question which does 
not rest upon existing facts or rights, or which 
seek a judgment in a pretended controversy when 
in reality there is none, or one which seeks a deci-
sion in advance about a right before it has actually 
been asserted or contested, or a judgment upon 
some matter which when rendered for any cause 
cannot have any practical legal effect upon the ex-
isting controversy." 
To decide the question as appellant proposes would 
fall squarely within the prohibition of the above announced 
rule of law. With the great quantity of land in Utah under 
Federal ownership a question that has the far-reaching 
effects of appellant's claim under the reservation theory 
certainly should not be decided as an abstract proposition 
in this action. 
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D. THE AW ARDS TO NEBEKER UNDER 
WATER USER'S CLAIMS NOS. 265, 2716, 
2718 AND 2719 DO NOT CONFLICT WITH 
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR'S 
ADMINISTRATION OF LANDS UNDER 
THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT. 
Finally we urge that it was not error for the District 
Court to award to Nebeker the use of water under Claims 
Nos. 265, 2716, 2718 and 2719. None of the cases which 
appellant cites so hold. The cases of United States v. Cox, 
190 F. 2d 293 (1951); Osborne v. United States, 145 F. 2d 
292 (1944); and LaRue v. Udall, 324 F. 2d 428 (1963)., all 
dealt with the government's right to take the land used by 
the permittees for other purposes. In each case the right of 
the government to take the land for the new use was upheld, 
and the permittee was not considered to have any vested 
property right in the public lands; but none of these cases 
dealt with water or water rights problems. However, we do 
not contend that this proceeding binds the Secretary of the 
Interior in his administration of federal lands. As we have 
previously discussed in this brief, this is solely an adjudi-
cation of existing uses to water and certainly it cannot be 
construed as adjudicating any right to federal lands. Ap-
pellant asserts that the alleged error in regard to these 
awards could be solved by merely an inclusion of a provi-
sion in the decree which would state that the Nebeker 
rights are subject to all authority of the Secretary of the 
Interior under the Taylor Grazing Act. We submit that 
insofar as this administration of federal lands is concerned, 
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this action does not purport to govern the Secretary of the 
Interior in his administration of the lands under the Taylor 
Grazing Act. Further, there was no evidence presented 
to the trial court of any conflicting claims of appellant's 
permittees to these sources. If a dispute to the use of these 
sources arises in the future, it will have to be resolved at 
that time. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the water user's claims submitted by ap-
pellant the decree of the trial court properly awards the 
rights covered by these claims to appellant as being ac-
quired under state law. Appellant did not plead or prove 
a right to the use of any water in excess of the rights con-
tained in the proposed determination. Further, appellant 
failed to demonstrate that the decree of the District Court 
purports to interfere with the administration of federal 
lands by the Secretary of the Interior. Therefore, the de-
cree of the District Court should be affirmed. 
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